Device Independent Quantum Private Query with Finite Number of Entangled
  Qubits by Basak, Jyotirmoy et al.
Device Independent Quantum Private Query with Finite Number of Entangled Qubits
Jyotirmoy Basak1, Bappaditya Ghosh1, Arpita Maitra2 and Goutam Paul1
1Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata,
Email: {bjyotirmoy.93,bappaditya.ghosh86}@gmail.com,
goutam.paul@isical.ac.in
2Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, India,
Email: arpita76b@gmail.com
In a recent work by Maitra et al. (Phys. Rev. A, 2017), it was shown that the existing Quantum
Private Query (QPQ) protocols fail to maintain the database security if the entangled states shared
between Alice and Bob are not of a certain form. So it is necessary to certify the states a priori. In
this regard, the local CHSH test was proposed. However, the proposed scheme works perfectly for
the asymptotic case when we have infinite number of qubits. In this brief report, we upgrade the
protocol for finite number of qubits and connect the sample size to the success probability of CHSH
test. We also perform a rigorous security analysis of the proposed protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum private query is a two party mistrustful cryp-
tographic primitive. In QPQ one of the two legitimate
party, say Bob, owns a database. His job is to protect
the entire database from the client’s (Alice’s) knowledge
along with providing the element asked by the client. On
other hand, the client’s motivation is to extract more el-
ements from the database beside her query.
Giovannetti et al. [1] first proposed the idea of QPQ
protocol followed by [2, 3]. However, their protocols were
found difficult to implement in practice. With the moti-
vation for practical implementation Jakobi et al. [4] came
out with a QPQ proposal which is based on SARG04
quantum key distribution protocol [5]. In 2012, Gao et
al. [6] presented flexible QPQ protocol. Here, flexible
means Bob can regulate the information of Alice about
the shared key between themselves by controlling some
parameters. In 2014, Yang et al. [7] proposed the entan-
glement version of [6] with the help of B92 QKD proto-
col [8].
Any QPQ protocol deals with database security and
user privacy. Database security guarantees that the pro-
tocol never leaks any element of the database to the client
except the query he or she has made. On the other hand,
user privacy prevents the database owner to know the
query of the client. Very recently, Maitra et al. [9] showed
that if the entangled states shared between Bob and Al-
ice are not in a specific form, then Alice can exploit a
strategy by which she can extract more information than
what is suggested by the protocol. In other words, if
the entangled states are not in a certain form, then the
database security becomes vulnerable. To resist such at-
tack, they proposed local CHSH test [10]. Observing the
outcomes of the test, they certify whether the states are
suitable for further use in QPQ protocol.
For DI protocols [11–14] involving maximally entan-
gled state, e.g., for QKD-type protocols, the success
probability of Bob has to be precisely the maximum pos-
sible, i.e., cos2pi/8 ≈ 0.85 and hence infinitely large num-
ber of qubits are required to estimate this probability.
However, for the QPQ protocol, for any given θ, the max-
imum probability may be less than cos2pi/8. Thus, we
can reduce the number of qubits at the cost of allowing
the estimated probability to deviate from the expected
maximum probability by a negligible amount.
Due to the above deviation, we have to allow some
information leakage to Alice. However, we show that
this information leakage entirely depends on how much
deviation we should accept for the test. The order of the
information leakage is exactly same as the order of the
deviation allowed.
In this report we follow up the work of [9] in the mo-
tivation towards bridging the gap between theory and
practice.
II. MODIFICATION TOWARDS FINITE
NUMBER OF ENTANGLED STATES
In [9], it has been shown that if the entangled states
shared between Bob and Alice are not in a certain form,
then Alice can exploit a cleaver strategy to gain more
information about the shared key than what is suggested
by the protocol. Thus, to ensure the security of the QPQ
protocol, it is necessary to test the shared states a priori.
As Alice is considered as an adversary here, so it is Bob
who tests the states. The test proposed in [9] is actually
the CHSH test performed locally with non-maximally en-
tangled states. Under some reasonable assumptions the
scheme presented in [9] works perfectly when the num-
bers of the entangled states tend to infinity.
In this section, we will discuss how we can modify the
protocol [9] for the finite numbers of entangled states.
Firstly, we try to estimate the number of qubits for the
local CHSH test in an optimal way. By the word ‘optimal’
we want to mean that the estimated value should be the
minimum number of samples required for the local CHSH
test. Secondly, we show that the deviation which we have
to allow to upgrade the protocol for finite sample size
does not open a security loop-hole in the protocol.
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2A. Maximization of success probability
In DI-QPQ protocol [9], Bob and Alice share en-
tangled states of the form 1√
2
(|0〉B |φ0〉A + |1〉B |φ1〉A),
where, |φ0〉A = cos ( θ2 )|0〉 + sin ( θ2 )|1〉 and |φ1〉A =
cos ( θ2 )|0〉−sin ( θ2 )|1〉. The value of θ is known to all. Bob
chooses two measurement bases namely {|ψ1〉 ,
∣∣ψ⊥1 〉} and
{|ψ2〉 ,
∣∣ψ⊥2 〉}, to play the local CHSH game. Here, |ψ1〉 =
cos ψ12 |0〉 + sin ψ12 |1〉 and |ψ2〉 = cos ψ22 |0〉 + sin ψ22 |1〉.
Now, for a particular value of the angles ψ1, ψ2 and θ,
only Bob can calculate the success probability value of
the local CHSH game, hence, preventing Alice to manip-
ulate the states and the measurement devices. Here we
propose a modification of the scheme [9].
In the DI-QPQ protocol [9], Bob gets the success
probability in terms of θ, ψ1 and ψ2 which is equal to
1
8 (sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2) + 12 . To max-
imize the quantity, we have to maximize sin θ(sinψ1 +
sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2.
Now, we can write,
sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2
= sin θ sinψ1 + sin θ sinψ2 + cosψ1 − cosψ2
= (sin θ sinψ1 + cosψ1) + (sin θ sinψ2 − cosψ2)
Setting sin θ = r cosφ and 1 = r sinφ, we get
(r cosφ sinψ1 + r sinφ cosψ1)
+(r cosφ sinψ2 − r sinφ cosψ2)
= r(sin(ψ1 + φ) + sin(ψ2 − φ)),
where r2 = 1 + sin2 θ, r cosφ = sin θ and r sinφ = 1.
Thus we get, tanφ = cosec θ i.e, φ = tan−1(cosec θ ).
Again, the value r(sin(ψ1 + φ) + sin(ψ2 − φ)) will be
maximum when both sin(ψ1 +φ) = 1 and sin(ψ2−φ) = 1
i.e, when (ψ1 + φ) =
pi
2 and (ψ2 − φ) = pi2 . From that we
get, ψ1 = (
pi
2 − φ) and ψ2 = (pi2 + φ).
FIG. 1: Plot of pmax as a function of θ
As we know the value of θ, we can easily calculate the
value of ψ1 and ψ2 from the above equations and play the
local CHSH game for these ψ1 and ψ2. For these values
of ψ1 and ψ2, the success probability value corresponding
to that θ will be maximum. Figure 1 shows how pmax
varies as θ varies between 0 to pi, taking the maximum
value of cos2pi/8 at θ = pi/2.
B. Expected estimation on the sample size
We recall the Chernoff-Hoeffding [17] bound here.
Proposition 1. Let X = 1m
∑
iXi be the average of
m independent random variables X1, X2, · · · , Xm with
values [0, 1], and let E[X] = 1m
∑
i E[Xi] be the ex-
pectation value of X, then for any δ > 0, we have
Pr [|X − E[X]| ≥ δ] ≤ exp(−2δ2m).
In our case, if the i-th run of the CHSH test succeeds,
we set Xi = 1; otherwise Xi = 0. Note that E[X] =
E[Xi] = p (say), the expected success probability of the
CHSH test. The variable X denotes the actual success
probability p′.
Now the question is how large should “the number of
samples” be so that we get a good “accuracy” of the given
state with high “confidence”? More precisely, suppose we
want to estimate the success probability p within an error
margin of p and confidence 1− γ, meaning
Pr[|p′ − p| ≤ p] ≥ 1− γ, (1)
where p′ and p are the estimated and the expected val-
ues respectively. Comparing Equation (1) with Proposi-
tion 1, we want, for given , p and γ,
exp(−22p2m) ≤ γ, i.e., m ≥ 122p2 ln 1γ .
FIG. 2: Plot of mopt (vertical axis) as a function of  (left)
and pmax (right) with γ = 0.01
This implies that as the value of the success probability
increases, the required sample size decreases. Denoting
3the maximum success probability for a specific θ by pmax,
we can write,
mopt =
1
22p2max
ln
1
γ
.
This mopt gives the optimal value of the sample size
required to certify the states for a given θ. Figure 2
shows how mopt varies with  and pmax, when we fix the
confidence at 99%.
C. Security bounds against additional information
leakage
Now, we will propose a bound on the value of  so that
exploiting this deviation, Alice can not extract significant
amount of information about the key shared between Bob
and herself.
In our modified version of the local CHSH test, we
suggest that if the maximum success probability of the
given state lies within the specified interval then Bob
accepts the state and proceeds the protocol otherwise
Bob aborts the protocol.
It may happen that for some other state (for exam-
ple, (α|0〉B |φ0〉A + β|1〉B |φ1〉A), where |α|2 = ( 12 + A)
and |β|2 = ( 12 − A)) the success probability value lies
within this interval. Now to cheat Bob, Alice may sup-
plies a state of the above form. In this case, if Alice
chooses the basis {|φ0〉A, |φ⊥0 〉A} with probability 12 − A
and {|φ1〉A, |φ⊥1 〉A} with probability 12 + A, she can ex-
tract ( 12 + 2
2
A) sin
2 θ fraction of entire key stream [9]
which is prohibited by the protocol.
To close such type of security loop-hole (which arises
due to the finite sample size) we bound the value of  so
that the additional information which is leaked to Alice
should be infinitesimally small.
Let, in spite of the claimed state, Bob is provided the
states of the form (α|0〉B |φ0〉A + β|1〉B |φ1〉A). Rigor-
ous calculations show that the success probability for
these states merges to 12 +
1
8 sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) +
1
4
√
1
4 − 2A(cosψ1 − cosψ2) + 14A cos θ(cosψ1 + cosψ2).
We denote this success probability value by p′′. Now
for the given state to be successfully verified, this suc-
cess probability value (p′′) must lie within the interval
[pmax − pmax, pmax + pmax], where pmax is the maxi-
mum success probability of the original claimed state for
a given θ and  is the accuracy parameter chosen by Bob.
So, p′′ must satisfy
pmax − pmax ≤ p′′ ≤ pmax + pmax.
Now from the left and right inequalities, we get 2A ≥
− 2pmaxcosψ1 and 2A ≤
2pmax
cosψ1
respectively. Since negative A
is not meaningful, we have the solution as
A ≤
√
2pmax
cosψ1
. (2)
Here, we consider only the situation when ψ1 ∈ [0, pi2 ).
This is because from the previous calculation we get that
the value of ψ1 always lies within [0,
pi
2 ) whenever θ ∈
[0, pi2 ].
So, to deceive Bob the states are prepared in such a
way such that the value of A must satisfy the condition
A ≤
√
2pmax
cosψ1
. Otherwise, with a high probability the
success probability of the given state will not lie within
the specified interval and Bob will abort the protocol.
From the earlier section we get that for a given θ, the
values of pmax, ψ1 and ψ2 are fixed. So, we can write A ≤
k
√
, where k =
√
2pmax
cosψ1
is a constant for a given θ. In
this case, Alice will get the additional information which
equals to 2A sin
2 θ [9]. Thus, the information leaked to
Alice remains in order of . If we choose the value of
 sufficiently small, say 10−10, then we can bound the
leakage in the order of 10−10.
III. MODIFIED DI-QPQ PROTOCOL WITH
OPTIMAL SAMPLES AND SECURITY
ANALYSIS
Now, we are in the state to propose our modified
protocol for finite sample size. Bob first calculates the
value of ψ1 and ψ2 for which the claimed state attains
the maximum success probability. Then from the cal-
culated maximum success probability pmax, Bob calcu-
lates the required optimal sample size mopt for the local
CHSH test to certify the states with certain accuracy
and confidence. Bob starts with n = 2mopt number of
entangled states (see Section III A for explanation). Let
ΓCHSH denote the set which contains the states for lo-
cal CHSH test, where |ΓCHSH | = mopt and ΓQPQ de-
note the set which contains the remaining states, i.e.,
|ΓQPQ| = n −mopt = mopt. Bob chooses the states for
each of ΓCHSH and ΓQPQ uniformly at random from the
given set of n states. Our modified protocol has been
described in Algorithm 1.
Note that the assumptions considered in [9] also re-
main valid for our modified version. Explicitly, here also,
we assume i) the inherent correctness of the quantum
mechanics, ii) no information leakage from the legitimate
parties’ laboratories, iii) devices are memoryless i.e., each
use of the devices is independent and iv) the detectors
have unit efficiencies.
A. Security Analysis of the Modified Protocol
The security analysis of the modified protocol follows
from the following result (see Appendix A for proof).
Theorem 1. If for a subset ΓCHSH of size m, the frac-
tion of the inputs (xi, yi), i ∈ ΓCHSH , which satisfy
the CHSH condition i.e., (ai ⊕ bi = xi ∧ yi) is equal to
1
8 (sin θ(sinψ1 +sinψ2)+cosψ1−cosψ2)+ 12 −δ, then for
41. For rounds i ∈ {1, · · · , |ΓCHSH |}
(a) Bob chooses input xi ∈ {0, 1} and yi ∈ {0, 1}
uniformly at random.
(b) If xi = 0, he measures the first qubit of the
entangled state in {|0〉, |1〉} basis and if xi = 1, he
measures that in {|+〉, |−〉} basis.
(c) Similarly, if yi = 0, Bob measures the second qubit
of the entangled state in {|ψ1〉, |ψ⊥1 〉} basis and if yi = 1,
he measures that in {|ψ2〉, |ψ⊥2 〉} basis, where the values
of ψ1 and ψ2 have been calculated previously.
(d) The output is recorded as ai(bi) ∈ {0, 1} for the
first and second particle respectively. The encoding for
ai(bi) is performed as follows.
• For the first qubit of each pair, if the measurement
result is |0〉 or |+〉 then ai = 0; if the result is |1〉
or |−〉 then it would be 1.
• For the second qubit of each pair, if the
measurement result is |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉 then bi = 0 ;
and if the measurement result is |ψ⊥1 〉 or |ψ⊥2 〉,
then bi = 1.
(e) Testing: For the test round i ∈ ΓCHSH , define
Yi =
{
1 if ai ⊕ bi = xi ∧ yi
0 if otherwise.
2. If the value of 1|ΓCHSH |
∑
i Yi lies within the range
[pmax − pmax, pmax + pmax], where pmax equals
1
8 (sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2) + 12 and  is
the accuracy parameter chosen by Bob, Bob proceeds the
protocol otherwise Bob aborts the protocol.
3. When the local CHSH test at Bob’s end is successful,
Bob proceeds for the subset ΓQPQ and sends one halves
of the remaining entangled pairs to Alice.
4. Alice performs the private query phase as described
in [7].
Algorithm 1: Modified protocol
the remaining subset ΓQPQ of size n −m, a fraction of
inputs (xi, yi), i ∈ ΓQPQ, which satisfy the CHSH con-
dition, is also equal to 18 (sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 −
cosψ2) +
1
2 − δ with a statistical deviation ν.
Here, δ =
√
1
2m ln
1
CHSH
and ν =√
(m+1)
2(1−mn )m2 ln
1
QPQ
, CHSH and QPQ are negligi-
bly small value.
Essentially, the result means that if the success proba-
bility of the local CHSH game for the set ΓCHSH varies
in the range [pmax − pmax, pmax + pmax], where pmax
equals 18 (sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2) + 12 and
 is the accuracy parameter, then the success probability
of the game for the set ΓQPQ would vary in the range
[pmax − pmax − ν, pmax + pmax + ν].
Note that in Theorem 1, if n is close to m, then ν is no
longer guarranteed to be negligible. On the other hand,
the choice n ≥ 2m makes the coefficient of (m+1)m2 ln 1QPQ
less than 1 and thus is practically a good choice.
So far, the entire security analysis, including that of
QPQ [7] and DI-QPQ [9], is performed under the assump-
tion that the states provided by Alice are all identical.
Indeed, when n is infinitely large, Alice cannot have any
advantage in non-uniformly biasing the states, as Bob se-
lects the subset ΓCHSH uniformly randomly. However,
when n  2m, but finite, then Alice could inject more
bias in the choice of her basis than the threshold
√
2pmax
cosψ1
(from Eq. (2)) for a few states and no bias for the remain-
ing states and still she could pass the CHSH test by Bob.
More formally, if she injects a bias ′A in r out of n states
uniformly at random, then it can be easily shown that to
pass the CHSH test, the following condition is required.
′A ≤
√
2npmax
r cosψ1
. (3)
Thus, by choosing r  n, Alice can lift the threshold of
′A much higher than that of A and can also retrieve more
number of keys if the corresponding states are selected
for QPQ.
To resist this attack, Bob has to choose the minimum
possible n, i.e., n = 2m. Since Bob will take m = mopt
as per our analysis in Section II A, we have n = 2mopt.
One may think that the restriction on n would limit
Bob to know the key bits for all the positions of the
database. This can be easily taken care of by allowing
Alice and Bob to play the game repeatedly, each time
corresponding to new sets of positions in the database,
so as to cover all the positions for Bob.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this current draft, we propose an upgradation of
the device independent quantum private query protocol
presented by Maitra et al [9]. We actually modify the
protocol for finite sample size. We identify that the sug-
gested protocol in [9] works perfectly in asymptotic limit.
However, for practical implementation we always have to
deal with finite sample size. This is why we motivated
to upgrade the protocol [9] for practical purpose. In this
regard, we estimate the sample size for the local CHSH
test in an optimal way. On other words, we search for
a strategy which certify the states with high confidence
in such a way that the number of samples required for
the testing should be minimal. In this direction, we show
that if we deal with the maximum success probability of
the game for a given θ, we can reduce the number of
samples significantly. We also show that the information
leakage to Alice depends on the accuracy parameter .
The order of information leakage is equal to the order of
 meaning the smaller the  is, the better the security of
the protocol.
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V. APPENDIX A: LEMMAS AND PROOFS
Lemma 1. (Serfling [18]) Let {x1, x2, · · · , xn} be a list
of values in [a, b] (not necessarily distinct). Let x =
1
n
∑
i xi be the average of these random variables. Let k
be the number of random variables X1, X2, · · · , Xk cho-
sen from the list without replacement. Then for any value
of δ > 0, we have Pr [|X − x| ≥ δ] ≤ exp
(
−2δ2kn
(n−k+1)(b−a)
)
,
where X = 1k
∑
iXi.
Lemma 2. ( [10], Corollary to Serfling Lemma) Let
X = {x1, x2...xn} be a list of (not necessarily distinct)
values in [0, 1] with the average µX =
1
n
∑
i=1 xi. Let T
be a subset of X of size t with average µT = 1t
∑
i∈T xi.
Let K be the remaining subset of X with size k (i.e.,
t + k = n). If the average of the subset K is µK =
1
n−t
∑
i∈K xi, then for any value of  > 0, we have
Pr
(
|µK − µT| ≥
√
n(t+1)
2t2(n−t) ln
1

)
≤ .
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. We define a random variable Yi as follows: Yi =
1, if ai ⊕ bi = xi ∧ yi; 0 otherwise. Now, we
choose a subset ΓCHSH of size m and define Y =
1
m
∑
i∈ΓCHSH Yi. Here, Y is called observed average
value. Let the expected value of Y for that subset be
E(Y ) = 18 (sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2) + 12 .
Then applying Chernoff-Hoeffding bound (Proposition 1)
we get Pr [|Y − E(Y )| ≥ δ] ≤ exp(−2δ2m).
Let CHSH be a negligibly small value. Equating
exp(−2δ2m) with CHSH we can find the value of δ =√
1
2m ln
1
CHSH
.
Again, we consider the remaining subset ΓQPQ of size
n − m and define Y ′ = 1(n−m)
∑
i∈ΓQPQ Yi. Now, from
Lemma 3, it can be shown that Pr(|Y − Y ′| ≥ ν) ≤
exp
(
−2m2ν2(n−m)n
(m+1)n2
)
.
Let QPQ be a negligibly small value. Then, equating
the R.H.S with QPQ, we get ν.
